This paper proposes SilentDelivery, a secure, scalable and cost-efficient protocol for implementing timed-delivery of private information in a decentralized blockchain network. SilentDelivery employs a novel combination of threshold secret sharing and decentralized smart contracts. The protocol maintains shares of the decryption key of the private information of an information sender using a group of trustees recruited in a blockchain network before the specified future time-frame and restores the information to the information recipient at the required time-frame. To tackle the key challenges that limit the security and scalability of the protocol, SilentDelivery incorporates two novel countermeasure strategies. The first strategy, namely silent recruitment, enables a trustee to get recruited by a sender silently without the knowledge of any third party. The second strategy, namely dual-mode execution, makes the protocol run in a lightweight mode by default, where the cost of running smart contracts is reduced from O(n) to O(1). We implement the protocol over the Ethereum official test network. The results demonstrate that SilentDelivery is more secure and scalable compared to the state of the art and reduces the cost of running smart contracts by 85%.
I. INTRODUCTION
Rapid advancements in Internet technology has led to a proliferation of information exchange happening in the cyberspace. Timed information delivery service (TIDS) refers to a class of service that enables an information sender to make a piece of private information arrive at an information recipient during a chosen future time-frame. Many scenarios require timed delivery of information in real-world. For example, courier services allow clients to select a predetermined time-frame during which their mail can be delivered. 1 The ability of TIDS to control the arrival time of sensitive information and knowing precisely when information arrives can be crucial for many businesses and enterprises 2 . Imagine a situation in which Alice would like her business proposal to arrive at the corporate headquarter exactly during the board meeting time. Here, an early arrival of the proposal could potentially leak her idea to her competitors while a late arrival will remove Alice's proposal out of the competition. While 1 E.g., UPS customers can pick a 2-hour time frame for ensuring a confirmed delivery. https://www.ups.com/us/en/help-center/sri/ups-my-choice-delivery-window.page 2 https://www.rapidparcel.com/timed-delivery/ there are numerous services (e.g., Boomerang 3 and Postfity 4 ) that provide pre-scheduled timed delivery of information, current implementations of timed information delivery services (TIDS) are heavily centralized. These services require the users to entirely trust the centralized servers and their security properties are solely limited to a single point of trust. More importantly, even in scenarios when the service providers are considered trustworthy, the services are still prone to unpredictable security breaches or insider attacks that are beyond the control of the service providers [1] , [2] . On the other hand, the emergence of Blockchain technologies such as Ethereum [3] and Smart contracts [4] provides significant potential for new security designs that support a decentralized implementation of TIDS to overcome the single point of trust issues associated with centralized approaches.
In this paper, we present SilentDelivery, a secure, scalable and cost-efficient protocol for implementing timed-delivery of private information in a decentralized blockchain network. SilentDelivery employs a novel combination of threshold secret sharing [5] and decentralized smart contracts [4] . The protocol maintains shares of the decryption key of the private information of an information sender using a group of trustees recruited in a blockchain network before the specified future time-frame and restores the information to the information recipient at the required time-frame. Here, the use of smart contracts leads to two key challenges that impact the security and scalability of the protocol. First, for the sake of fair trade, the protocol requires senders and trustees to conclude recruitment relationships via smart contracts but the transparency of smart contracts makes it difficult to conceal the relationships before the future time-frame which challenges the service security in multiple aspects. Second, due to the use of threshold secret sharing, the protocol requires senders to recruit a large number of trustees to gain higher service availability which involves O(n) cost for carrying out the interactions between the n recruited trustees and smart contracts. SilentDelivery incorporates two novel countermeasure strategies to tackle these challenges. The first strategy, namely silent recruitment, enables a trustee to get recruited by a sender silently without the knowledge of any third party while still making it possible for the recruitment relationship to be revealed to the smart contracts during a future time-frame. The second strategy, namely dual-mode execution, makes the protocol run in a lightweight mode by default, where the non-scalable regulations are cut off to reduce the cost of running smart contracts from O(n) to O(1). When a dispute occurs, any recruited trustee reserves the ability to switch the protocol to a heavyweight mode by rebinding the removed regulations with smart contracts to redress and penalize any fraudulent or dishonest behavior, just as if these regulations were never decoupled. We implement the protocol over the Ethereum official test network. The results demonstrate that SilentDelivery is more secure and scalable compared to the state of the art and reduces the cost of running smart contracts by 85%. To the best of our knowledge, SilentDelivery is the first practical decentralized approach designed for TIDS that is secure, scalable and cost-efficient.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we discuss the preliminaries about smart contracts and introduce the key cryptographic tools used in our work. While we discuss smart contracts in the context of Ethereum [4] , we note that our solutions are also applicable to a wide range of other smart contract platforms.
A. Smart contracts
A smart contract (or contract) in Ethereum is a piece of program created using a high-level contract-oriented programming language such as Solidity 5 . After compiling into a low-level bytecode language called Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) code, the created contract is packaged into a transaction, which is then broadcasted to the entire Ethereum network formed by tens of thousands of miner nodes. Following the Proof-of-Work (PoW) consensus protocol [6] , all the miners in Ethereum competitively solve a blockchain puzzle and the winner packages the received transactions into a block and appends the new block to the end of Ethereum blockchain. From then on, it is hard to tamper with the contract as each miner maintains a copy of the new block and an adversary has to falsify majority of these copies in order to change the network consensus about the contract. In Ethereum, any user can create a transaction to call any accessible function within a deployed contract. The function called by this transaction is then executed and verified by the miners and its inputs and outputs are both recorded in Ethereum blockchain. In other words, smart contracts in Ethereum are executed transparently in a decentralized manner and the results are deterministic.
In order to either deploy a new contract or call a deployed contract in Ethereum, one needs to spend Gas. Based on the complexity of the contract or that of the called function, a part of Ether 6 needs to be spent in order to purchase an amount of Gas, which is then paid to the miner that creates the new block. The Gas system is important for Ethereum as it helps incentivize miners to stay honest, nullify denial-of-service attacks and encourage efficiency in smart contract programming. On the other hand, the Gas system requires protocols, especially the multi-party ones, to be designed with higher scalability in Ethereum. This is due to the fact that even a single-round multi-party protocol could spend a lot of money to run in case of a large number of participants.
B. Cryptographic tools
The design of SilentDelivery employs several key cryptographic tools: (1) (t,n)-threshold secret sharing [5] is used to split the decryption key of the private information into n shares, among which any t shares could recover the key but t − 1 or fewer shares fail to do that. Specifically, we denote the key split and key restoration as shares ← SS.split(key, [t, n]) and key ← SS.restore(shares, [t, n]), respectively. (2) we use the Keccak 256-bit hash function supported by Ethereum and it is denoted as hash( * ). (3) we use the ECDSA signature supported by Ethereum. In Ethereum, each account is controlled by a pair of keys. An account is uniquely identified through a 20-byte address derived from its public key and can sign messages with its private key via vrs ← ecsign(hash(message)). Later, any other account or smart contract can recover the address of the message signer (i.e. addr(signer)) via addr(signer) ← ecrecover(hash(message), vrs).
III. A STRAWMAN PROTOCOL
We first describe the timed information delivery service (TIDS) as a three-phase process. We then propose a strawman protocol that implements TIDS using threshold secret sharing and smart contracts. We finally analyze the key limitations of the strawman protocol in terms of its security and scalability.
A. TIDS as a three-phase process
We describe the TIDS problem as a three-phase process:
• TIDS.send: The information sender (or sender, S) sends her private information with a time-frame and the identity of information recipient (or recipient, R) to the TIDS provider. • TIDS.pend: The TIDS provider preserves the private information before the specified time-frame. • TIDS.deliver: The TIDS provider delivers the private information to the recipient during the specified time-frame.
B. The strawman protocol
We first propose a strawman protocol that implements TIDS using threshold secret sharing and smart contracts. We sketch the strawman protocol in Fig. 1 and present the formal description in Fig. 2 . Specifically, the regulations of the strawman protocol are programmed as an agent contract C agent , through which a sender can recruit a group of Ethereum accounts to jointly take the role of the TIDS provider. We name each account serving for TIDS a trustee, T . The protocol demands each trustee T to register itself to the agent contract C agent via newT rustee(whiskey, Ξdeposit), where whiskey is a key used to establish a private communication channel with the trustee using the Ethereum Whisper protocol 7 . Ξdeposit represents the amount of Ether(Ξ) that will be locked in C agent as a security deposit. We can understand that there is a recruitment agreement at C agent , which goes into effect only when it has been signed by both a sender and a trustee, so that the registration of a trustee in this context means that the trustee has signed on a recruitment agreement and has promised to serve for future senders without violating the protocol. Otherwise the Ξdeposit will get confiscated. We next describe the three phases of the strawman protocol in detail. TIDS.send: Sender S first creates a key as well as a receipt, splits key into shares via secret sharing and encrypts both her private information (or inf o) and receipt with key. Sender S then sets up a new service with C agent via newService() and specifies the service details including a future time-frame [day, slot], parameters [t, n] for secret sharing and addresses (i.e., addr( * )) of both recipient R and a list (i.e., List( * )) of randomly selected registered trustees. In addition, sender S also commits the values of shares and receipt by submitting their hash values (i.e., hash( * )) to C agent and locks an amount of Ether as Ξremuneration to pay the trustees. Finally, through private channels, sender S assigns each recruited trustee a share and transmits the encrypted [inf o, receipt] to recipient R. Here, the submission of addresses of selected trustees implies that sender S has signed the recruitment agreements with these trustees and has promised to pay Ξremuneration for a successful service. From then on, the agreements signed by both sides come into force. TIDS.pend: If any recruited trustee discloses its maintained share before the time-frame, any trustee obtaining this share will be able to report the premature disclosure of this share to C agent via reportP remature( The strawman protocol. The symbol ⇒ denotes calling a function of a smart contract. The symbol → denotes transmitting data through a private channel. A step with a gray bullet (e.g., 1 ) refers to an off-chain action not recorded by blockchain while a step with a white bullet (e.g., 2) refers to an on-chain action recorded by blockchain.
in C agent , this function will be able to verify this report and divide Ξdeposit of the accused trustee to the informer as well as sender S in case of a true report. TIDS.deliver: During the time-frame, each trustee reveals its maintained share to C agent via revealShare(). Recipient R, after restoring key and decrypts [inf o, receipt], receives inf o and notifies the arrival of inf o by revealing receipt to C agent via revealReceipt(). Finally, each honest recruited trustee can either keep serving for future senders without requesting withdrawals or stop working and withdraw Ξdeposit and accumulated Ξremuneration from C agent .
C. Limitations and challenges
We identify two challenges that significantly limit the security and scalability of the strawman protocol: (1) Premature revelation of recruitment relationships: In the strawman protocol, a recruitment agreement (or agreement) is first signed by a registered trustee and then signed by a sender. The agreement comes into force at step 2 while at the same moment the included recruitment relationship (or relationship) is made known to all via the uploaded addresses of recruited trustees, namely List(addr(T )). Later, the protocol ends at step 9, allowing each honest recruited trustee to make withdrawals. After revisiting this procedure, we observe that the relationships were getting revealed much earlier than necessary. Specifically, the relationships were made public at step 2 while only at step 9, namely the settlement stage, it becomes necessary for C agent to know List(addr(T )) to approve withdrawals. Such a premature revelation of relationships endangers the security of TIDS in two aspects. First, it has been widely recognized that the anonymity offered by blockchain networks is not strong [7] and therefore, premature revelation helps an adversary locate recruited trustees before TIDS.deliver. Specifically, for the sake of anonymity, one may create a new Ethereum account to be a trustee. However, this new account must have been transferred an amount of Ether by an existing account in order to call newT rustee() and pay Ξdeposit. In case that the information of the owner of the existing account has been disclosed at public places such as a forum, the anonymity of the trustee account has been breached via the connection of the two accounts. An adversary could then leverage the disclosed information about the existing account to attack the new trustee account. This significantly weakens the underlying protections of the trustees offered by the large-scale anonymous Ethereum P2P network. In an ideal scenario when no information about the relationships is disclosed, from the view of an adversary, all the registered trustees have equal probability to be recruited by a sender, which maximizes the difficulty and cost of attacking recruited trustees. Second, in case of a recruited trustee seeking collusion with any other party, the premature revelation helps the trustee prove its relationship to that party, which further promotes the success of the trading between these mutually distrusted two parties. What makes the problem more challenging is that the relationships may get revealed through side information, other than just List(addr(T )). For instance, even if we conceal List(addr(T )) in step 2, due to the public List(hash(share)), a trustee can still prove its relationship by revealing its maintained share. To make matters worse, even if the strawman protocol has forbidden any premature disclosure of shares through reportP remature(), it is still possible for a sophisticated trustee to bypass this restriction by offering a zero-knowledge proof π [8] to demonstrate that the trustee knows the pre-image of h(share) (i.e., share), without revealing share, thus being able to prove its relationship without being panelized. Therefore, to overcome this difficulty, we need a solution that can conceal both List(addr(T )) and all possible side information (e.g., List(hash(share))) before TIDS.deliver while still making List(addr(T )) get back in C agent during TIDS.deliver to help C agent process withdrawal requests.
(2) A tradeoff between scalability and availability of TIDS: We observe that the non-scalable design of the strawman protocol leads to O(n) gas cost for a sender to recruit n trustee, which makes the protocol hard to scale in practice. There are two places in the strawman protocol that make the gas cost go with O(n). First, at step 2, after sender S uploads List(addr(T )), an amount of gas needs to be spent in C agent to change the state of each recruited trustee and bind this trustee with this service. Second, at step 6, each recruited trustee needs to spend an amount of gas to reveal its maintained share to C agent so that the share can be verified through the hash(share) in C agent and made known to recipient R. Obviously, the simplest way of reducing gas cost would be recruiting fewer trustees. However, given a fixed t regarding (t, n)-threshold secret sharing as well as a fixed probability that a single share gets lost, a larger n results in a higher probability of recovering key at protocol step 7, namely higher availability of TIDS [9] . This shows the tradeoff between scalability and availability of the TIDS. To address this, we propose a redesign of the protocol so that the non-scalable regulations within C agent can be removed while the removed regulations can still constrain the behaviors of protocol participants just as if these regulations are still bounded with C agent in blockchain.
IV. THE SilentDelivery PROTOCOL
In this section, we start by introducing our key ideas for tackling the challenges that limit the strawman protocol. We then present the proposed SilentDelivery protocol and focus on its two novel countermeasure strategies, namely silent recruitment and dual-mode execution. We sketch the SilentDelivery protocol in Fig. 3 and formally describe it in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 .
A. Tackling the challenges
We observe both similarities and differences in tackling the two challenges presented in Section III-C. Regarding similarities, both the two challenges demand a way for removing data from the agent contract C agent while they also need the removal to get rolled back when a certain condition is reached. Specifically, a solution for the first challenge, namely the premature revelation of recruitment relationships, should remove recruitment relationships from C agent before TIDS.deliver and later reveal the relationships to C agent during TIDS.deliver. Similarly, a solution for the second challenge, namely the tradeoff between scalability and availability of TIDS, should remove non-scalable regulations from C agent and later reveal these regulations to C agent in case of any violation of them occurred. The main differences between them are twofold: (1) the removed relationships should be concealed against any third party while the removed regulations should still be made public; (2) the rollback of the removal of relationships is inevitably driven by the arrival of time-frame while the rollback of the removal of regulations is driven by violations of these regulations, which is completely avoidable when the recruited trustees are honest.
By keeping these similarities and differences in mind, in SilentDelivery, we design two different countermeasure strategies for tackling the two challenges. As illustrated in Fig. 3 , the first countermeasure strategy is implemented as a silent recruitment component within the TIDS.send phase. The key idea behind it is to consider the relationships also a type of private information that demands timed delivery, so both senders and trustees should sign their recruitment agreements secretly and their signatures should also be protected with the key split into shares. The second countermeasure strategy, namely dual-mode execution, allows the protocol to be executed in two different modes. Specifically, we cut the non-scalable regulations out of C agent and re-organize them as a supplementary contract C sup . By default, when recruited trustees honestly follow the removed regulations, the protocol goes with its lightweight mode without involving any O(n) on-chain interactions. If any recruited trustee violates the removed regulations, any honest trustee can rebind the removed regulations (i.e., C sup ) with C agent to penalize the violations, which turns the protocol into the heavyweight mode and results in a pay-cut. Thus, the penalty of misbehaviors and the pay-cut induced by the heavyweight mode can incentivize recruited trustees to stay honest, making the protocol stays at its lightweight mode with O(1) gas cost.
B. Silent recruitment
Before presenting the TIDS.send phase, it is worth noting that SilentDilivery demands each trustee to create a list of [privkey, pubkey] key pairs for a list of future time-frames [day, slot], maintain all the privkeys by itself and submit all the pubkeys to the agent contract C agent during registration via newT rustee(). During TIDS.send, sender S first deploys a switch contract C sw , which contains a single function deploySupplementary(). Just like the name implies, through C sw , any honest trustee can deploy the supplementary contract C sup and turn the protocol from the default lightweight mode into the heavyweight mode. Since the only transaction that is allowed to be sent by C sw creates C sup , the address of C sup is deterministic and can be computed by sender S at protocol step 1. After that, sender S sets up a service with C agent without disclosing any (side) information revealing recruitment relationships, thus achieving the first design goal presented in Section ??. From then on, silent recruitment is executed via private channels in the form of a three-way handshake. Specifically, sender S initials the handshake by giving each trustee the two contracts C sw and C sup , a signature vrs sup regarding the two contracts and an index assigned to the trustee. Upon getting contacted, each trustee verifies the correctness of service information and sends back a signature vrs t ← ecsign(hash(addr(C sw ), index)) to sender, which implies that the trustee has agreed to take charge of this service. Upon receiving trustee's signature, sender S also generates a signature vrs s ← ecsign(hash(addr(C sw ), index, vrs t )), which says that sender S has agreed to recruit the signer of vrs t in this service. Then, similar to the strawman protocol, sender S creates shares of a key and a receipt. However, unlike the strawman protocol, these shares are not directly given to trustees. Instead, at protocol step 8, each share is iteratively encrypted with l pubkeys from l different recruited trustees, where l is a parameter determined by sender S at protocol step 2. In this way, each share is turned into an onion and its recovery needs privkeys maintained by l trustees. This design allows the premature disclosure of a share to be verified through pairing the disclosed privkeys with the pubkeys in C agent , instead of having to rely on hash(share) that reveals recruitment relationships. Finally, through private channels, sender S makes all these onions public, transmit a list of encrypted tuple [index, vrs s , vrs d ] to each recruited trustee and encrypted [inf o, receipt] to the recipient.
C. Dual-mode execution
Next, we present the dual-mode execution. By default, SilentDilivery is executed in the lightweight mode, resulting in O(1) gas cost by assuming all recruited trustees are honest. In case of any misbehaviors, the protocol is switched to the heavyweight mode, which spends gas in O(n) and reduces remuneration received by recruited trustees. Thus it incentivizes the trustees to stay honest to earn a higher profit. We design the dual-mode execution to include six epochs spreading across the TIDS.deliver phase. Specially, we consider the TIDS.pend phase as epoch-0, during which any trustee can switch the default lightweight mode to the heavyweight mode by deploying C sup via C sw and report a prematurely disclosed privkey. Then, in epoch-1, if the recruited trustees honestly obey the non-scalable regulations shifted from C agent to C sup by revealing their privkeys to recipient R via private channels, R will be able to recover key and acquire inf o and receipt, which makes the protocol reach a successful termination and jump to epoch-6, namely the settlement stage. In case that some trustees violate the regulations in C sup and result in a failure of recovering key, the protocol will enter epoch-2, during which any honest trustee can switch the protocol into the heavyweight mode (i.e., epoch-3) by deploying C sup via C sw . After that, the recruited trustees reveal privkeys to all via Whisper protocol, decrypt onions to shares, recover key from shares and finally acquire the list of tuple [index, vrs s , vrs d ]. Each tuple can prove a recruitment relationship to C sup by revealing an agreement signed by a trustee via vrs t and by a sender via vrs s . If the key can not get recovered, the protocol researches a failed termination and jumps to epoch-6. During epoch-3, the protocol is executed in the heavyweight mode, demanding each recruited trustee to reveal its privkey to C sup via revealP rivkey(). Furthermore, any absent or fake privkey that were not appropriately submitted during epoch-3 will be identified as misbehavior and reported during epoch-4, resulting in the dishonest trustee to lose Ξdeposit. After that, epoch-5 provides the second chance of making the protocol end with success, though in heavyweight mode. Finally, during epoch-6, depending on how the protocol terminates, the protocol participants can request withdrawals at C agent .
Phase
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V. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
In this section, we present the implementation and evaluation of the proposed SilentDelivery protocol. We programmed the protocol as smart contracts using Solidity, the most commonly used smart contract programming language. We also anonymously deployed the contracts to the Ethereum official test network rinkeby 8 for evaluation purpose.
In TABLE I, we list the key functions in the programmed smart contracts that interact with protocol participants during different phases of SilentDelivery and the cost of these functions in both Gas and USD. The cost in USD was computed through cost(U SD) = cost(Gas) * GasT oEther * EtherT oU SD, where GasT oEther and EtherT oU SD were taken as their mean value during the first half of the year 2019 recorded in Etherscan 9 , which are 1.67 * 10 −8 Ether/Gas and 175 USD/Ether, respectively. As illustrated by the results, in the lightweight mode, the completion of a service only requires a sender to deploy C sw ($1.81) and set up a new service ($0.24) during TIDS.send and a recipient to submit the receipt ($0.16) during Epoch-1, which costs only $2.21 in total. This cost is independent of the number of recruited trustees, namely O(1), so the tradeoff between security and scalability is eliminated and the scalability of TIDS gets significantly improved. In contrast, the heavyweight mode requires a sender to deploy C sw ($1.81) and set up service ($0.24) during TIDS.send and a trustee to deploy C sup ($7.10) and reveal identities of all recruited trustees during Epoch-2 ($0.21n). It then requires all recruited trustees to reveal privkeys during Epoch-3 ($0.27n) and finally a recipient to submit the receipt ($0.16) during Epoch-5. It thus costs $(9.31 + 0.48n) for completing a service that recruits n trustees. If any misbehavior occurs, the reporting functions can be invoked during Epoch-1 and Epoch-4 and the cost for calling these reporting functions will be deducted from Ξdeposit paid by protocol violators.
Next, we compare the cost of SilentDelivery with that of Kimono [10] , a recent project that also employed Ethereum to 8 release private information to future via recruiting trustees. We tested the cost of recruiting different numbers of trustees in the two projects and displayed the results in Fig. 6 . As can be seen, compared with Kimono, the SilentDelivery protocol proposed in this paper is much more scalable and cost-effective. Due to the removal of non-scalable regulations, the lightweight mode offers O(1) cost, which for the first time makes a decentralized approach for timed-delivery of private information practical and scalable. We noticed that even the heavyweight mode is more scalable than Kimono. This is due to the use of silent recruitment, which reduces the cost of the protocol during TIDS.send. In summary, compared with the state of the art, both the modes offered by SilentDelivery are more scalable. Particularly, the lightweight mode of SilentDelivery can reduce the cost of recruiting more than 20 trustees by over 85%.
VI. RELATED WORK
A. Sending private information to a future time point
The study of timed release of private information began with May [11] . Since then, there have been extensive studies on this problem. One representative approach [12] , [13] , [14] protects private information with a time-lock puzzle, forcing recipients to solve a cryptographic puzzle to obtain the information. Nevertheless, the time for solving such puzzles is non-deterministic and as a result, the delivery time of the information can not be precisely controlled. Also, cryptographic approaches for timed data release come with a very significant computational cost and as such, these techniques are not scalable. Another well-studied approach [15] , [16] , [17] relies on a (semi-)trusted time server to release time trapdoors to recipients at specified future time points. These techniques involve a single point of trust and create a safety bottleneck. The recent emergence of blockchain technology [6] and smart contracts [4] have started the development of new decentralized approaches. One of the decentralized approaches [18] , [19] , [20] encloses private information with blockchain puzzles used in Proof-of-Work [6] and therefore minimizes the computational burden of the information senders as the blockchain puzzles are periodically solved by blockchain miners. However in such an approach, the involved heavy cryptographic primitives result in very high performance overhead [19] , [21] . Another direction of recent decentralized techniques for timed data release [21] , [22] , [10] leverages smart contracts [4] to establish a decentralized virtual autonomous agent, through which an information sender could recruit a group of peers from the blockchain network as her trustees to cooperatively maintain and deliver her private information to recipients. Here, the transparency of smart contracts makes it difficult to conceal any information recorded by the virtual agent and therefore challenges the service security in multiple aspects. Besides that, the cost of running smart contracts in this approach is proportional with the number of recruited trustees, making it costly to recruit more trustees to gain higher service availability. Our work in this paper tackles the key limitations of the state-of-the-art approaches using blockchain-based smart contracts [21] , [22] , [10] . To the best of our knowledge, SilentDelivery is the first decentralized solution for the timed data release problem with strong guarantees on security, scalability and cost-efficiency.
B. Scaling blockchain with off-chain channels
Payment channel network (PCN) [23] , [24] is a promising technique for improving blockchain scalability, which allows two parties to trade through off-chain channels without having to be charged by blockchain for every payment transaction between them. Recently, PCN was extended to state channel network (SCN) [25] so that in addition to payment transactions, all general transactions that interact with smart contracts can be supported. While dual-mode execution scheme proposed in this paper is inspired by PCN and SCN, it further extends the objective from only reducing the cost between the two parties to also reducing the cost of running the protocol involving multiple participants.
C. Using cryptocurrency as security deposits
There have been many recent efforts on blockchain-based protocol design that leverage cryptocurrency as security deposits to penalize unexpected behaviors and improve security. Andrychowicz et al. [26] used bitcoin to penalize anyone who unfairly aborts a secure multiparty computation (SMC). Kiayias et al. [27] proposed to use bitcoin as collateral to protect digital content. In [28] , the authors use Ether as security deposits to provide verifiable cloud computing. Matsumoto et al. [29] used Ether as security deposits to enforce certificate authorities to be honest. Inspired by these previous efforts, SilentDelivery demands each trustee lock Ether in smart contracts as security deposits to penalize potential misbehaviors violating the protocol and thereby enforces recruited trustees to stay honest.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes SilentDelivery, the first practical decentralized solution for cost-effectively implementing timed-delivery of private information with strong security and scalability guarantees. Our solution employs a novel combination of threshold secret sharing and decentralized smart contracts and tackles two key challenges that significantly limit the security and scalability of the protocol.
Through silent recruitment, SilentDelivery makes a trustee get recruited by a sender silently without the knowledge of any third party while still making it possible for the recruitment relationship to be revealed to the smart contracts during a future time-frame. Through dual-mode execution, SilentDelivery incentivizes trustees to make the protocol get executed in the lightweight mode, reducing the service cost from O(n) to O(1). We implement the protocol over the Ethereum official test network. The results demonstrate that SilentDelivery reduces the cost of running smart contracts by over 85% and is more secure and scalable compared to the state of the art.
